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SERRATIA MARCESCENS BACTEREMIA TRACED TO AN INFUSED NARCOTIC
BELINDA E. OSTROWSKY, M.D., M.P.H., CYNTHIA WHITENER, M.D., HELEN K. BREDENBERG, M.D.,
LORETTA A. CARSON, M.S., STACEY HOLT, B.S., LORI HUTWAGNER, M.S., MATTHEW J. ARDUINO, DR.P.H.,
AND WILLIAM R. JARVIS, M.D.

ABSTRACT
Background From June 30, 1998, through March
21, 1999, several patients in the surgical intensive
care unit of a hospital acquired Serratia marcescens
bacteremia. We investigated this outbreak.
Methods A case was defined as the occurrence of
S. marcescens bacteremia in any patient in the surgical intensive care unit during the period of the epidemic. To identify risk factors, we compared patients
with S. marcescens bacteremia with randomly selected controls. Isolates from patients and from medications were evaluated by pulsed-field gel electrophoresis. The hair of one employee was tested for fentanyl.
Results Twenty-six patients with S. marcescens
bacteremia were identified; eight (31 percent) had
polymicrobial bacteremia, and seven of these had
Enterobacter cloacae and S. marcescens in the same
culture. According to univariate analysis, patients with
S. marcescens bacteremia stayed in the surgical intensive care unit longer than controls (13.5 vs. 4.0
days, P<0.001), were more likely to have received
fentanyl in the surgical intensive care unit (odds ratio, 31; P<0.001), and were more likely to have been
exposed to two particular respiratory therapists (odds
ratios, 13.1 and 5.1; P<0.001 for both comparisons).
In a multivariate analysis, receipt of fentanyl and exposure to the two respiratory therapists (adjusted odds
ratio for one therapist, 6.7; P=0.002; adjusted odds ratio for the other therapist, 9.5; P=0.02) remained significant. One respiratory therapist had been reported for
tampering with fentanyl; his hair sample tested positive for fentanyl. Cultures of fentanyl infusions from
two case patients yielded S. marcescens and E. cloacae. The isolates from the case patients and from the
fentanyl infusions had similar patterns on pulsed-field
gel electrophoresis. After removal of the implicated
respiratory therapist, no further cases occurred.
Conclusions An outbreak of S. marcescens and
E. cloacae bacteremia in a surgical intensive care unit
was traced to extrinsic contamination of the parenteral narcotic fentanyl by a health care worker. Our findings underscore the risk of complications in patients
that is associated with illicit narcotic use by health
care workers. (N Engl J Med 2002;346:1529-37.)
Copyright © 2002 Massachusetts Medical Society.

S

ERRATIA MARCESCENS has been implicated as a pathogen in a large array of infections.1 Nosocomial S. marcescens outbreaks have
been associated with contaminated equipment,
such as transducers 2,3 and bronchoscopic equipment4;
contaminated fluids and cleaning solutions5-7; contaminated hands or fingernails of employees8; and a reduced nurse-to-patient ratio.9
From June 30 through September 30, 1998, nine
cases of S. marcescens bacteremia were detected in
the surgical intensive care unit of a 455-bed tertiary
care facility. Because of the rarity of serratia species
in clinical specimens and the similar antimicrobialsusceptibility patterns in these cases, eight of the nine
isolates were sent to a secondary laboratory for genotyping. When the laboratory was unable to determine
the genotype of the isolates, they were sent to the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
for pulsed-field gel electrophoresis, which showed
that seven of the eight isolates had indistinguishable
patterns. From October 1, 1998, to March 11, 1999,
16 more patients acquired S. marcescens bacteremia,
and the CDC was invited to assist in the investigation of this outbreak. After our investigation began,
a 26th patient was found to have S. marcescens bacteremia. The objectives of our investigation were to
define the extent of the problem, identify the source
and risk factors, and implement control measures.
METHODS
Determination of Trends over Time
We reviewed the hospital’s microbiology records for bloodstream
infections caused by serratia species and other gram-negative bacteria from July 1996 through March 1999; we then compared the
rates of bacteremia during the epidemic period (from June 30,
1998, through March 21, 1999) and before the epidemic period
(from July 1, 1996, through June 29, 1998). Serratia species isolated from tissues other than blood during the epidemic period also
were reviewed.

From the Division of Healthcare Quality Promotion, National Center
for Infectious Diseases (B.E.O., L.A.C., S.H., M.J.A., W.R.J.), the Epidemic Intelligence Service, Division of Applied Public Health Training
(B.E.O., H.K.B.), and the Division of Public Health Surveillance and Informatics (L.H.), Epidemiology Program Office, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta; and the Pennsylvania State University College
of Medicine, Milton S. Hershey Medical Center, Hershey (C.W.). Address
reprint requests to Dr. Ostrowsky at the Department of Epidemiology and
Infection Control, Medical College of Virginia Campus at Virginia Commonwealth University, P.O. Box 980019, Richmond, VA 23298-0019, or
at bostrow@hsc.vcu.edu.
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Definition and Ascertainment of Cases
A case was defined as any instance of S. marcescens bacteremia
in a patient in the hospital’s surgical intensive care unit that was
diagnosed during the epidemic period. Cases were identified by
review of infection-control, microbiologic, and medical records.
Case–Control Study
To identify which patients in the surgical intensive care unit
were at risk for S. marcescens bacteremia, we compared patients
with such bacteremia (case patients) with randomly selected controls (patients who stayed in the hospital’s surgical intensive care
unit for at least 48 hours during the epidemic period without acquiring gram-negative bacteremia). Factors assessed included demographic and clinical characteristics of the patients and exposure
to devices, procedures, and medications. The severity of illness was
assessed by means of the Acute Physiology and Chronic Health
Evaluation (APACHE II) score,10 determined within 24 hours after admission to the surgical intensive care unit. To assess exposure
to health care workers, we determined which physicians, nurses, and
respiratory therapists had contact with case patients and controls
as documented by their signatures in the medical records. Data on
exposure were collected for case patients from the time of admission to the surgical intensive care unit until the diagnosis of the
S. marcescens bacteremia. Exposure data for controls were collected
from the time of admission to the surgical intensive care unit up
to the median length of stay at which S. marcescens bacteremia was
diagnosed in the case patients (seven days), or until discharge from
the surgical intensive care unit, if the control stayed in the unit for
less than seven days.
Review of Procedures and Microbiologic Studies
We reviewed pharmacy procedures and infection-control policies
and practices in the surgical intensive care unit and respiratory-therapy areas.
S. marcescens isolates from case patients were sent to the CDC
for species confirmation, antimicrobial-susceptibility testing, and
pulsed-field gel electrophoresis by standard methods.11 On March
17, 1999, tracheal or urinary cultures were obtained from all patients
in the surgical intensive care unit to identify those with colonization.
Prior environmental cultures performed by hospital personnel were
reviewed. Water samples from the rooms in which case patients had
stayed, the offices of the surgical intensive care unit and the respiratory-therapy area, the nursing stations of the surgical intensive care
unit, and the restrooms in the vicinity of the surgical intensive care
unit were sent to the CDC for processing.12 Cultures of medications
infused at the time of onset of symptoms in the case patients were
obtained and processed in the hospital’s microbiology laboratory.
Medication bags used for selected patients were forwarded to the
CDC for additional testing. Cultures were obtained from unopened
bottles or vials of selected medications and from the hands of a sample of health care workers by the hand-wipe method.13
Statistical Analysis
Data were collected on standardized forms and analyzed with use
of Epi Info software (version 6.03, CDC) and SAS software (version
6.12, SAS Institute). The rates of bacteremia before and during
the epidemic period were compared by the chi-square test. For the
case–control study, categorical and continuous variables were compared with use of appropriate univariate tests. Odds ratios and 95
percent confidence intervals were calculated. Multivariate logisticregression analyses were performed in which all variables that were
significant (P<0.05) in univariate analysis were included.

RESULTS
Trends over Time in the Rate of S. marcescens Bacteremia

The hospital-wide rate of S. marcescens bacteremia
was significantly higher during the epidemic than

before the epidemic (0.43 vs. 0.028 infection per
1000 patient-days, P<0.001). S. marcescens was significantly more likely to be isolated from patients in
the surgical intensive care unit than from other patients (6.2 vs. 0.06 isolates per 1000 patient-days,
P<0.001). The rates of S. marcescens bacteremia in
areas other than the surgical intensive care unit were
similar during and before the epidemic (0.02 vs. 0.06
infection per 1000 patient-days, P=0.2). In contrast,
the rate of S. marcescens bacteremia in the surgical intensive care unit was significantly higher during the
epidemic than before it (8.1 vs. 0.1 isolates per 1000
catheterization-days, P<0.001). Only 10 serratia isolates from sources other than blood or catheters were
identified during the epidemic period; 3 of these were
obtained from case patients after bacteremia had been
identified.
Identification and Characteristics of Patients
with S. marcescens Bacteremia

Twenty-six patients with S. marcescens bacteremia
were identified during the epidemic period (Fig. 1).
The median length of stay in the surgical intensive
care unit before a positive blood culture was obtained
was 7 days (range, 2 to 26). Seventeen of these patients were male (65 percent); the mean age of the
patients was 48.2 years (range, 17 to 87). Of the 26
cases of bacteremia, 8 (31 percent) were polymicrobial, in 7 of which (27 percent) Enterobacter cloacae
was identified in the same culture as S. marcescens,
and 13 (50 percent) were persistent (S. marcescens was
identified in blood cultures on two or three different
dates over a range of two to nine days). Eleven patients (42 percent) were receiving antimicrobial agents
to which the S. marcescens isolate was susceptible at
the time the positive blood culture was obtained. In
contrast, 11 cases of polymicrobial bacteremia were
detected during the epidemic period; only 3 did not
include serratia species.
Case–Control Study

In a univariate analysis, case and control patients
were similar in terms of sex, age, the proportion undergoing surgery, the proportion requiring mechanical ventilation, the proportion requiring respiratory
therapy, the proportion with exposure to fentanyl
anywhere in the hospital, and mortality. Patients with
S. marcescens bacteremia were significantly more likely
than controls to have been admitted because of trauma; to have a longer stay in the surgical intensive care
unit, a higher median temperature, or rigors; to have
undergone bronchoscopy; and to have received a
blood transfusion or fentanyl, particularly as a continuous infusion, in the surgical intensive care unit
(Table 1). The median number of days of continuous fentanyl infusion and the median total dose were
higher for case patients than for controls. Further-
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Figure 1. Distribution of Cases of Serratia marcescens Bacteremia from January 1, 1997, to April 30, 1999.
Hatched blocks indicate patients with polymicrobial bacteremia.

more, in 17 case patients (65 percent), the blood
culture that yielded S. marcescens was collected while
they were receiving a fentanyl infusion or within 24
hours after they had received a fentanyl infusion.
Background of Personnel

Three types of health care workers had substantial
contact with patients in the surgical intensive care
unit: physicians, nurses, and respiratory therapists. A
single surgical team provided care for most of the patients in the surgical intensive care unit, and several
subspecialty services assisted. Designated surgical intensive care unit nurses were not permanently assigned
to a particular station. Eight respiratory therapists were
assigned to the surgical intensive care unit, and numerous other respiratory therapists (more than 30)
cared for patients in the surgical intensive care unit as
well as other patients.
Univariate analyses indicated that several health
care workers were associated with a patient’s having
S. marcescens bacteremia (Table 1). One physician
(Physician 5) was significantly associated with such
bacteremia; however, he had recorded contact with
only 15 of the 26 case patients. No nurse had recorded contact with more than 10 case patients. Among
the respiratory therapists, five were significantly associated with bacteremia. One respiratory therapist
(designated Respiratory Therapist 18) had documented contact with 23 of 26 case patients (88 percent).

Furthermore, Respiratory Therapist 18 worked within 48 hours before a positive culture was obtained in
two of three case patients with no contact documented by their individual medical records.
Analysis of data on the health care workers was
complicated, because many different employees provided care to any given patient throughout the patient’s hospital stay, and even within one hospital day.
This was particularly true of the respiratory therapists (Fig. 2).
In multivariate analyses, only receipt of a continuous fentanyl infusion and receipt of care from Respiratory Therapist 18 or Respiratory Therapist 3 were
independent risk factors for S. marcescens bacteremia. Furthermore, when we performed multivariate
analyses including only the 25 case patients and 24
controls who received continuous fentanyl infusions,
receipt of care from Respiratory Therapist 18 or
Respiratory Therapist 3 remained independent risk
factors for S. marcescens bacteremia (Table 2).
Independently of our investigation, a report was
filed at the hospital by a nurse in the surgical intensive
care unit who witnessed Respiratory Therapist 18 manipulating intravenous infusions (including fentanyl)
at the bedside of a patient on two occasions. She observed Respiratory Therapist 18 crouched down by
the bedside (far from the ventilator) holding a needle. Both incidents involved a single patient (Patient
24), samples of whose fentanyl infusion grew clonal
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TABLE 1. POTENTIAL RISK FACTORS IN PATIENTS WITH SERRATIA MARCESCENS
BACTEREMIA AND CONTROLS FROM JUNE 30, 1998, THROUGH MARCH 21, 1999.*

POTENTIAL RISK FACTOR

PATIENTS WITH
BACTEREMIA
(N=26)

Categorical variables
Patient characteristics or symptoms — no. (%)
Trauma
Fever
Rigors
Death
Exposures — no. (%)
Procedures or devices
Bronchoscopy
Transfusion
Respiratory therapy
Medications — no. (%)
Fentanyl anywhere in hospital
Fentanyl in SICU
Continuous fentanyl infusion in SICU
Lorazepam in SICU
Personnel — no. (%)
Physician 5
RT 18
RT 3
RT 16
RT 11
RT 13
Continuous variables
Length of SICU stay — days
Median
Range
APACHE II score
Median
Range
Continuous fentanyl infusion
Total dose — µg
No. of days
Median
Range

16
26
4
3

(62)
(100)
(15)
(12)

CONTROL
PATIENTS
(N=65)

14
53
1
2

(22)
(82)
(2)
(3)

11 (42)
26 (100)
26 (100)

4 (6)
52 (80)
62 (95)

26
25
25
18

(100)
(96)
(96)
(69)

59
29
24
22

(91)
(45)
(37)
(34)

15
23
18
19
19
19

(58)
(88)
(69)
(73)
(73)
(73)

12
24
20
21
25
32

(18)
(37)
(31)
(32)
(38)
(49)

ODDS RATIO
(95% CI)

P VALUE

5.8 (1.9–17.9) <0.001
—†
0.02
11.6 (1.1–294)
0.02
4.1 (0.5–38.6)
0.13
11.2 (2.7–50)
—†
—†

<0.001
0.02
0.55

—†
0.18
31 (3.8–637) <0.001
42 (5.3–893) <0.001
4.4 (1.5–13.3)
0.002
6.0
13.1
5.1
5.7
4.3
2.8

(2.0–18.8)
(3.2–62)
(1.7–15.5)
(1.9–18.0)
(1.4–13.5)
(0.9–8.6)

<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
0.003
0.04

13.5
3–40

4.0
2–45

<0.001

18.0
9–30

14.0
4–28

0.09

27,979

6100

<0.001
<0.001

5
2–27

2
1–7

*CI denotes confidence interval, SICU surgical intensive care unit, RT respiratory therapist, and
APACHE II Acute Physiology and Chronic Health Evaluation.
†The odds ratio could not be determined.

strains of serratia and enterobacter species when cultured. Subsequently, Respiratory Therapist 18 agreed
to testing of hair samples for fentanyl. Hair samples
collected by personnel from the hospital on March
26, 1999, and sent to an independent laboratory
were positive for fentanyl.14,15 Respiratory Therapist
18 was placed on administrative leave and his hospital employment was subsequently terminated. The
26th case was diagnosed within three days after this
employee’s removal, and no additional cases have
been identified in the more than two years since he
left the hospital.
Microbiologic and Molecular Studies

Our March 17, 1999, surveillance cultures identified S. marcescens in only 1 of 22 patients who were

then in the surgical intensive care unit. In addition,
more than 50 environmental cultures performed by
hospital staff during the epidemic period were negative for serratia species, as were all 19 water samples.
Samples of intravenous infusions administered to
two patients were recovered at the time of the onset
of symptoms of bacteremia. S. marcescens and E. cloacae were isolated from cultures of the fentanyl infusions of one patient (Patient 21). Cultures of the dopamine infusion given during the same period to
this patient were sterile. Fentanyl-infusion cultures
from the second patient (Patient 24), who had documented bacteremia with both S. marcescens and
E. cloacae, yielded E. cloacae at the hospital microbiology laboratory and E. cloacae and S. marcescens at
the CDC. A review of the Food and Drug Admin-
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Figure 2. Exposure of 26 Case Patients to Respiratory Therapists.
Each circle indicates the number of patients with S. marcescens bacteremia in whose charts a respiratory therapist’s signature was
identified. The comparisons are for five respiratory therapists (designated 3, 11, 13, 16, and 18) associated with bacteremia in the
univariate analyses.

istration Adverse Event Reporting System data base
failed to identify reports of intrinsic contamination of
this product from July 1998 through March 1999.
Cultures of unopened fentanyl ampules were sterile.
Of the 25 S. marcescens isolates from case patients
that were sent to the CDC, 24 had similar patterns
on pulsed-field gel electrophoresis. One case patient
had an isolate with a unique pattern; this patient was
the only one who did not receive continuous fentanyl
in the surgical intensive care unit. The S. marcescens
isolates cultured from fentanyl infusions administered
to Patients 21 and 24 were indistinguishable from
their blood isolates (Fig. 3A). All seven E. cloacae isolates from case patients and fentanyl-infusion isolates
from Patients 21 and 24 were indistinguishable (Fig.
3B). Cultures from the hands of three hospital employees, including Respiratory Therapist 18, were negative for S. marcescens and E. cloacae.
DISCUSSION

Fentanyl, an opiate narcotic approximately 80 times
as potent as morphine, has been used as an illicit
drug.16-18 Our investigation implicated fentanyl infused continuously in the surgical intensive care unit

as the source of bacteremia. Numerous data identified
Respiratory Therapist 18 as the most likely source of
the extrinsic contamination. He was the respiratory
therapist with the strongest association with patients
who had bacteremia. Independently of our investigation, there were reports of probable tampering with
fentanyl by Respiratory Therapist 18. In addition, a
hair sample from Respiratory Therapist 18 contained
fentanyl, documenting recent ingestion, injection,
or infusion of fentanyl. After the removal of Respiratory Therapist 18, there were no further cases of
S. marcescens bacteremia.
Another respiratory therapist routinely assigned to
the surgical intensive care unit, Respiratory Therapist
3, was identified as associated with S. marcescens bacteremia in patients. However, eight case patients’
medical records had been signed by Respiratory
Therapist 18 but not by Respiratory Therapist 3. After our analysis, we recommended to the hospital
personnel that hair from this respiratory therapist
and from other respiratory therapists significantly associated (P<0.05 by univariate analysis) with the
cases of S. marcescens bacteremia be tested for fentanyl. The hospital chose not to pursue further test-
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TABLE 2. RESULTS OF MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF RISK FACTORS
FOR SERRATIA MARCESCENS BACTEREMIA, FROM JUNE 30, 1998,
THROUGH MARCH 21, 1999.*

EXPOSURE

CASE
PATIENTS

CONTROL
PATIENTS

ODDS RATIO
(95% CI)

P VALUE

no. (%)

All patients†
Continuous fentanyl infusion in SICU
RT 18
RT 3
Patients receiving continuous fentanyl
infusion in SICU‡
RT 18
RT 3

25 (96)
23 (88)
18 (69)

24 (37)
24 (37)
20 (31)

44.3 (4.7–421.8)
6.7 (1.4–31.6)
9.5 (2.3–39.0)

0.001
0.002
0.02

23 (92)
17 (68)

11 (46)
4 (17)

11.1 (1.9–68.7)
8.9 (1.9–40.7)

0.009
0.005

*CI denotes confidence interval, SICU surgical intensive care unit, and RT respiratory therapist.
†Percentages are based on 26 case patients and 65 control patients.
‡Percentages are based on 25 case patients and 24 control patients.

ing, mainly because new cases had ceased to appear
by that time. Thus, we cannot exclude the possibility
that Respiratory Therapist 3 may have been an accomplice of Respiratory Therapist 18 or may have
committed similar acts. However, we are unaware of
any evidence implicating any respiratory therapist
except Respiratory Therapist 18 in fentanyl tampering, and no further cases occurred, despite the presence of Respiratory Therapist 3 after the removal of
Respiratory Therapist 18.
Respiratory Therapist 18 was implicated in the
contamination of fentanyl, but it is uncertain how
the fentanyl became contaminated. Despite repeated
interviews by hospital personnel, Respiratory Therapist 18 never admitted illicit-drug use or theft. We
hypothesize that reuse of needles to remove fentanyl
may have led to inadvertent contamination. Another
possibility is that a liquid was used as replacement
for fentanyl after the theft of the drug to replace the
missing volume of narcotic in the patients’ infusion
bags. Despite a search of the surgical intensive care
unit and the related environment for devices or water sources that could have been used in the theft of
fentanyl, no reservoir could be identified. A third
possibility is that fentanyl became contaminated during manipulation by the implicated employee’s hands.
Cultures collected from the hands of Respiratory
Therapist 18 were negative for serratia species and
enterobacter species; however, Respiratory Therapist
18 was warned that he would be tested.
It remains unclear how Respiratory Therapist 18
used fentanyl. His arms had no needle tracks, but he
could have injected fentanyl into another area of his

body. Fentanyl is used preoperatively as an oral agent
to supplement anesthesia19; an operating room supervisor’s dependence on fentanyl has been reported to
be associated with oral ingestion.20
Bacteremia associated with extrinsic contamination
of a narcotic by a health care worker has been described previously. In 1991, Maki et al. described several Ralstonia pickettii (formerly known as Pseudomonas pickettii) infections related to contamination of
fentanyl.21 A pharmacist resigned in conjunction
with this incident.
Theft of narcotics and the potential for resulting
complications in patients remain a problem in health
care settings. The episode described here might initially appear to be an isolated event related to poor
judgment on the part of an employee. However, this
outbreak persisted for more than nine months, with
a large group of hospitalized patients potentially at
risk. We are aware of another report of the theft of
narcotics used in intravenous infusions 22,23 (and unpublished data). Although these cases were not associated with bacteremia, one episode received wide attention in the media because of concern about the
possible spread of hepatitis B or hepatitis C virus.22,23
Estimates based on the 1991–1993 National
Household Survey on Drug Abuse indicate that 4.2
percent of hospital workers acknowledge current illicit-drug use, and 8.9 percent of workers report
previous illicit-drug use.24 In a survey of anesthesia
training programs in the United States, 214 (74 percent) had at least one report of illicit-drug use by a
trainee or an instructor.25
In our investigation, hair testing documented fen-
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Figure 3. Pulsed-Field Gel Electrophoresis of Bacterial Isolates.
Panel A shows Serratia marcescens isolates. The lanes are as follows: l, ladder DNA size marker; 1 to 3, S. marcescens isolates
from a cluster of three infections that occurred more than one year before the outbreak; 4 to 6, Patients 2, 3, and 4 (identified early
in the outbreak); 7 to 9, Patients 18, 19, and 20 (identified later in the outbreak); 10 and 11, isolates from blood and from fentanyl
infusion in Patient 21; 12 and 13, isolates from blood and from fentanyl infusion in Patient 24; 14 and 15, catheter-tip and peritoneal
isolates recovered from other unrelated patients after termination of the outbreak.
In Panel B (next page), Enterobacter cloacae isolates from seven patients with polymicrobial bacteremia are compared. The lanes
are as follows: l, ladder DNA size marker; 1 to 7, seven blood isolates from case patients (the isolate in lane 7 is from Patient 24);
and 8 and 9, isolates recovered from fentanyl infusions in Patients 24 and 21.

tanyl abuse by the implicated health care worker,
who denied such abuse. Hair testing can detect drug
exposure over a longer period than testing of blood
or urine.14,15 Head hair grows about 1 cm (0.4 in.)
per month, so a hair sample 10 to 13 cm (4 to 5 in.)
long can supply evidence of a subject’s drug use in
approximately the previous 10 months. Hair-testing
results are accepted by courts for prosecution purposes.14,15,26 Thorough washing of the hair sample
helps eliminate false positive results that might be produced by environmental contamination. Moreover,
thorough review of respiratory-therapy procedures
and procedures in the surgical intensive care unit

confirmed that respiratory therapists did not have
responsibility for narcotics and should not have had
contact with needles or narcotic infusions.
Our investigation identified a number of controversies surrounding drug use by health care workers.
Although the hospital had a policy that theft of narcotics should be investigated, there were no adequate
mechanisms in place to deal with theft of patients’
medications or possible resulting adverse events. The
report of the CDC (a nonregulatory agency), including a recommendation to notify any respiratory-therapy regulatory agency, was sent to the hospital administration and the state health department. Additional
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legal and ethical responsibilities of the hospital were
addressed by its administration and legal counsel.
The case was presented by a hospital official to the
area district attorney, but legal action was not pursued because of insufficient evidence.
We are indebted to the infection-control, microbiology, administrative, and clinical staff of the hospital for their extensive assistance
in our investigation of this outbreak.
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